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Illinois State University
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Len Jessup
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The ability to commercialize innovations is central to firm survival and
success and despite research on parts of the process, there is no overarching
framework. Successful commercialization can include retaining ownership of
the innovation and bringing it to market, sharing it by licensing or developing
it with partners, or by selling it. A firm-level model is constructed that goes
from innovation sourcing, through assessment of viability, to selection of the
optimum form of governance. External networks and absorptive capacity
at the meso level, plus micro- and macro-level factors, as moderators
affecting the strength of the relationship between viability and governance
are identified. Propositions are generated on these relationships for empirical
testing and further theoretical insight.

Would an author of today find a publisher for a book that advocated the
conservation of our natural resources because “We can see our forests vanishing, our
innovation is a complex notion and to truly see the inherent value in it in a corporate
setting, one must see innovation manifested in outcomes such as commercialized
products” (Schendel & Hill, 2007). In 2008, Nokia and Sony-Ericsson each
successfully introduced over seventy models of cellular phones, thus penetrating many
market niches. That pace of commercialization allowed the innovators to be successful
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with introduced products, and it raised barriers for potential competitors. Successful
commercialization of innovations is not only of strategic importance to firms (Nerkar
& Shane, 2007), but it is also a key driver of economic growth (Cohen & Levinthal,
1990; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Sorensen & Stuart, 2000; Zahra & Nielsen, 2002).
Schendel and Hitt (2007) argued that economic growth is related to entrepreneurial
activities. Entrepreneurial activities such as selection of partners, forming alliances,
and creating subsidiaries and spinouts are often centered around the commercial
potential of innovations and assessments of the related capabilities of firms. The ability
to commercialize innovations can help firms penetrate existing markets or create
new markets, which contributes to the attainment of sustained leadership and firm
longevity, which, in turn, positively impacts the health of the economy (Salamenkaita
& Salo, 2002; Wallsten, 2000).
It is therefore no surprise that governments at nearly all levels attempt to
mitigate market and other systemic failures that act as a barrier to innovation and
subsequent commercialization. A better understanding of the process of innovation
commercialization is therefore important at multiple levels. It has become generally
accepted that, on average, it takes about three thousand raw ideas to result in a
commercially successful product (Stevens & Burley, 1997). That statistic is far worse
in some industries such as pharmaceuticals where only one out of 10,000 compounds
succeeds as a new product, with an overall time from discovery to market of over a
decade and a total cost approaching $1 billion. Even worse, those statistics hide the
fact that more products could be successful but fail because of flaws in the process of
commercialization. Despite such a low probability to success, firms have to bring new
products to market because the alternative is the demise of the firm.
Firms typically depend on products developed three to five years ago for large
portions of their current sales, which means that they are aiming three to five years
in the future at a target that is both elusive and competitive in nature. Additionally,
globalization of markets has put more pressure on firms to commercialize innovations
in order to fend off global competition, to expand into global markets, or both (Collin
& Porras, 1997; Hamel & Getz, 2004 ; Hamel & Prahalad, 2002; Huber & Glick,
1993; Huygens et al., 2001; March, 1991). As the global environment continues to
grow at a faster pace, innovation is a requirement for ongoing organizational survival
and continuing success (Schendel & Hill, 2007). In addition to these global stimuli,
there are other environmental factors, such as rapid technological development, which
simultaneously enhance and exacerbate the need for successful commercialization.
Advances in information technology, and greater ease of use of these technologies, have
led to shorter cycle times in developing new technology applications. These changes
have resulted in greater process improvements and more efficient generation of new
products and product changes (Brynjolfsson & Mendelson, 1993; Gulati, Sawhney
& Paoni, 2002), which has further increased the speed with which firms and their
competitors need to innovate and commercialize. Clearly, innovation and subsequent
commercialization both are important, but where the former has received substantial
attention in the literature (Damanpour, 1991; Dougerty & Hardy, 1996; McGrath et al.,
1996; Pennings & Harianto, 1992; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997), the latter has not,
some seminal pieces notwithstanding (Andrew & Sirkin, 2003; Kelm, Narayanan &
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Pinches, 1995; Kwak, 2002; Narayanan et al., 2000; Nerkar & Shane, 2007). Thus, the
research question is posed: What are the determinants of success in commercialization of
innovations? In order to address this question, we explore the related questions of a)
what resources and capabilities are necessary to innovate and commercialize, and b) what
forms of governance help to maximize returns from innovation commercialization?
To answer these questions, a review of the literature on innovation and
commercialization is made. Then a baseline model of the innovation-commercialization
process that starts with sourcing of innovations is built, followed by an assessment of
viability, and finish with selection of the best governance form. The foundation for
this baseline model came from Schendel and Hitt’s (2007) contention that sources of
innovation are complex and multiple, and the value potential is difficult to assess. It
can be assusmed that the firm has the necessary motivation to innovate. The study also
adopts the view that innovation is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for successful
commercialization. Having innovated and found it to be viable not only legally, but also
in terms of profitability and access to the necessary capabilities for commercialization,
we then address the thesis that success in the ability to commercialize is contained
within selection of one of three forms of governance: own, partner, or sell. The strength
of the relationship between viability and governance is affected by four moderators,
two of which are firm level (external networks and absorptive capacity), one of which
is a micro-level factor (previous managerial experience), and one of which is a macrolevel factor (dynamism, munificence, and complexity in the operating environment).
To ease the process of identifying these main and moderating effects, this paper
assumes that there is demand for the innovation. It is also assumed that success in
commercialization arises from a rational and managed process, and that luck is not
counted upon as a factor input. Finally, the discussion is bound by limiting ourselves to
established firms that have cash flows or access to any needed capital that allows them
to make the expenditures that are necessary for commercialization.

Prior Research
The innovation process is defined as the combined activities leading to new,
marketable products and services, or new product-delivery systems (Burgelman,
Christensen & Wheelright, 2006), and a firm’s ability to innovate is dependent upon
its capabilities (Damanpour, 1991; Dougerty & Hardy, 1996; McGrath et al., 1996;
Pennings & Harianto, 1992; Teece et al., 1997), its human resource practices (Nerkar,
McGrath & MacMillan, 1996; Scott & Bruce, 1994), the nature of the top management
team (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Howell & Higgins, 1990), and the external environment
within which the firm operates (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993; Keats & Hitt, 1988;
Milliken, 1987; Wade, 1996). Other seminal work on innovation has concentrated
on the types of innovations: product versus process innovations (Burgelman et al.,
2006; Cooper, 1985; Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1986; Danneels, 2002; Dougerty &
Hardy, 1996; Herstatt & Von Hippel, 1992; Schilling, 2006); radical versus incremental
innovations (Burgelman et al., 2006; Dahlin & Behrens, 2005; Golder, Shacham & Mitra,
2008; Majchrzak, Cooper & Neece, 2004; Schilling, 2006); competence enhancing
versus competence destroying innovations (Burgelman et al., 2006; Schilling, 2006);
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architectural versus component innovations (Christensen, 1992a; Christensen, 1992b;
Christensen & Bower, 1996; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Wade, 1996).
Much of the literature just cited however, has treated innovation and its
commercialization as the same construct. In fact, commercialization in many cases
was assumed. While innovation characteristics are a necessary component of future
market success, innovation itself is not sufficient enough to ensure that success.
Instead, innovations generally lead to market success through the process of
commercialization (Drucker, 1985). While this growing body of work undoubtedly
contributes to our understanding of successful commercialization, it remains that a
dedicated model of the factors affecting commercialization is needed. That being said,
a few scholars have kept innovation and commercialization as separate and distinct
constructs. Commercialization of innovation has been defined as the act or activities
required for introducing an innovation to market (Andrew & Sirkin, 2003; Kelm et al.,
1995; Kwak, 2002; Narayanan et al., 2000; Nerkar & Shane, 2007). Nerkar & Shane
(2007) operationalized commercialization as the first sale of a given product or service.
However, when an innovation is introduced in the market, only technology enthusiasts
adopt it initially, and such enthusiasts comprise less than three percent of the market
(Moore, 1991, 2000). The larger mainstream market is comprised of pragmatists and
conservatives, so it can be argued that a successful commercialization is one that also
captures this mainstream market. Fully capturing the mainstream market is difficult,
therefore the threshold for ‘successful’ commercialization of an innovation will lie
somewhere between these two extremes—a single sale on the one hand and saturating
the mainstream of a market on the other (Moore, 1991, 2000).
New Product Development (NPD) has emerged in the literature as a complementary
dimension of commercialization of innovations and includes the selection of projects
for new product development (Cooper, 1985; Hansen, 1999; Herstatt & Von Hippel,
1992). The extant literature includes investigation into processes of NPD (Cooper &
Kleinschmidt, 1986; Hansen, 1999; Herstatt & Von Hippel, 1992; Johne & Snelson,
1989; Spivey, Munson & Wolcottl, 1997; Zirger & Maidique, 1990), the effects of path
dependency and leveraging of primary and second-order competencies (Danneels,
2002), identifying suppliers for NPD (Ragatz, Handfield & Scannell, 1997), predicting
success of NPD based on the type of idea and the circumstances of its emergence
(Goldenberg, Lehmann & Mazursky, 2001), and the role of network alliances in
information acquisition and its lagged effect on the new-product performance of
the firm (Soh, 2003). As a body of work, this research assumes, either explicitly or
implicitly, that the developed product does not violate existing intellectual property
rights, it will serve a viable market, and that the firm has the wherewithal to bring
the product to market either by itself (hierarchy) or with partners (alliances). Here,
those assumptions make explicit in a baseline model which then becomes the vehicle
for identifying the effect of other moderating factors that contribute to success in
commercialization.
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Baseline Model
The baseline model is comprised of three constructs: innovation sourcing, viability and
potential, and governance form. Sources of innovation can be internal or external to the
firm, and strategies to manage those sources are deliberate and emergent. Viability and
potential looks at the legal feasibility and profit potential of the innovation. Viability
and potential are linked with three forms governance: own, partner, or sell. Figure 1
depicts the constructs are linked and their relationships.
Figure 1: Baseline Model

Innovation Sourcing
Whereas the innovation process is defined as the combined activities that lead to
new, marketable products (Burgleman et al., 2006), innovation itself is defined as the
practical implementation of an idea into a new product (Markham, 2000; Schilling,
2006). As such, innovation sourcing means being aware of the disparate sources of
ideas and being willing and able to use them.
Sources of ideas for innovations can be internal or external to the firm. The internal
generation of ideas arises from organizational creativity, which can range from being
a one-off organizational aberration, to a formalized process that is embedded in the
culture or supported as a separate R&D function. The creativity of the organization is
a function of the creativity of individuals, social processes, and contextual factors that
shape the way individuals interact and behave (Woodman, Sawyer & Griffin, 1993).
Firm R&D intensity has been shown to have a positive correlation with sales from new
products, sales growth rate, and profitability (Roberts, 2001; Schilling, 2006). Thus,
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as a source of ideas for innovation, the R&D function, whether internally funded or
externally contracted, is key (Acs & Audretsch, 1988; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002;
Hagedoorn, 2002; Iwasa & Odagiri, 2004; Katila, 2002; Kelm et al., 1995; Kortum
& Lerner, 2000; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Levin, 1988; Penner-Hahn & Shaver, 2005;
Veugelers, 1997; Wallsten, 2000). It also is a readily apparent source and, as such, does
not need further elaboration aside from noting that it is the norm to have processes in
place for moving ideas forward for assessment for commercialization.
Discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities is somewhat probabilistic in nature,
as opposed to the result of a systematic search effort (Kirzner, 1997). Entrepreneurs
seem best able to “discover” opportunities for commercialization that directly relate
to their previous knowledge of markets, knowledge of how to serve those markets,
and knowledge of specific customer problems (Shane, 2000). This knowledge is not
equally distributed across all entrepreneurs and therefore, is necessarily a function of
their relationships with innovators, and funders (Anderson, 2008). Thus, recognition
of an opportunity to commercialize an innovation is more likely to happen within
a network of these entities (Seppanen & Skates, 2001) through knowledge sharing
and transfer.
Networks with customers, suppliers, complementors, and competitors also are
valuable sources of new product ideas (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1986; Yoon & Lilien,
1988). External sources of information also complement in-house R&D by increasing
a firm’s absorptive capacity (Chen, 2004; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin,
1998; Zahra & George, 2002). These sources include new ventures, licensing
arrangements, sourcing agreements, research associations, and government-sponsored,
joint research programs for technical and scientific interchange, as well as informal
networks (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Allen, 1977; Burt, 1992; Freeman, 1991; Hargadon
& Sutton, 1997, 2000). Such networks are especially important in high-technology
sectors where it is unlikely that an individual firm will possess all the capabilities
necessary to develop a significant innovation (Hagedoorn, 2002). Additionally,
technology spillovers, which are defined as a positive externality from R&D resulting
from the spread of knowledge across organization and regional boundaries (Cohen
& Levinthal, 1990; Schilling, 2006), also provide ideas for innovation. Technology
spillovers not only have a significant influence on innovation activities (Henderson,
Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 1998; Jaffe, 1986; Jaffe, Trajtenberg & Henderson, 1993), they also
increase a firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).
Strategies to Manage Sources of Ideas: Deliberate and Emergent
Strategy has been distinguished as deliberate and emergent (Bodwell & Chermack,
2009; Fuller-Love & Cooper, 2000; Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel,
1998; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). While deliberate strategies tend to emphasize
central direction and hierarchy, emergent ones open the way for collective action
and convergent behavior (Bodwell & Chermack, 2009; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).
Deliberate strategy is the specification of intended actions the firm plans to take to
achieve its goals, whereas emergent strategy happens when companies engage in actions
that evolve unplanned from past patterns or newly recognized patterns in the business
environment (Bodwell & Chermack, 2009). Few strategies are purely deliberate or
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purely emergent (Mintzberg et al., 1998). One means no learning, the other means no
control. As Mintzberg et al. (1998) argued, all real-world strategies need to mix these in
some way, which means exercising control while fostering learning. That means being
willing to use (or combine) ideas from R&D (deliberate) along with those that arise
from other sources of organizational creativity (emergent), or those from collaborations
(deliberate), along with those from networks and spillovers (emergent). Thus,
Proposition 1: Firms that have processes in place for monitoring both internal and
external sources and deliberate and emergent sources of ideas for innovation will
capture more ideas than those that rely on single sources.
Viability
The viability and potential of an innovation for development and commercialization
is determined through a series of legal searches and business decisions. A legal search
is required to determine whether or not the innovation infringes upon existing
patents and if so, whether or not those patents can be challenged. The business part
of the process is a series of decisions ranging from the tactical, such as whether to
kill an innovation project or support it, to the strategic, with the latter depending on
assessments of the potential market, barriers to entry into that market, fit with existing
products and service platforms, trends in the industry, externalities and installed base,
and the availability of complements. These issues are well described by Schilling (1998)
and do not need further discussion here. Instead, we simply assume that the strategy
of commercialization is viable and that the firm can profit in one way or another from
that commercialization.
It was Schumpeter (1934) who originally noted that because innovations can be
protected from imitation, they can provide superior returns. Those superior returns
generally are considered in terms of economic rents (Schumpeter, 1934). They can
occur in the form of monopoly rents, which arise from barriers to competition and
barriers to entry that prohibit existing and potential competitors from satisfying excess
demand. They can occur in the form of Ricardian rents, which arise from owning
scarce resources that permit development of the innovation. They can also occur in the
form of entrepreneurial rents, which are received by bringing to market a new product
or service. The latter are naturally self-destructive because, with patenting or bringing
to market a new product or service, the underlying knowledge is revealed (Mahoney &
Pandian, 1992).
Instead of earning rents from commercialization, there may be private benefits from
bringing an innovation to market, such as when it is a complementary product or service
that supports other existing activities. Thus, an innovation may be commercialized
even if it loses money, as long as the combined public and private returns are positive.
Any discussion of rents implies supernormal profits, but it long has been argued that
all that is needed to induce an entrepreneur to bring an innovation to market is the
guarantee of an irreducible minimum amount of profit (Marshall, 1967), such as that
which can be found be investing in zero-risk government securities. Extending that
thinking to managers in firms,
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Proposition 2: In the absence of the potential for economic rents or private benefits,
firms will still be willing to commercialize innovations that have positive but low
levels of return.
Governance
Governance deals with the form of structure required for commercialization.
Essentially, it is a choice among three options: ownership of the technology with its
development and commercialization being in-house, commercializing the innovation
with others either through an alliance or via licensing, or selling it for others to
commercialize. Usually, commercialization is thought of in terms of the first two forms,
but electing to sell an innovation also allows the firm to secure a return and arguably is
also a form of commercialization. The choice of which form to adopt is governed by: (a)
the amount of profit available from commercialization, and (b) the distance between
a firm’s existing capabilities and those required for it to be able to commercialize the
innovation. In the following discussion, we build on Teece’s (1986) contention that
regimes of appropriability must be in place and on the thesis that economic gain rests
critically upon a firm’s ability to create and transfer technology more quickly than it is
imitated in the market.
When the returns from an innovation are high and the firm already has the
requisite capabilities to build the assets that are required for commercialization then,
logically, development will be through hierarchy (in-house). If the capabilities are
not available internally, then sourcing them externally will reduce the firm’s ability
to earn rents from the innovation because suppliers of those resources will bid up
prices, or they may turn into potential competitors. An alternative is to develop
the capabilities internally. That requires an assessment of the effects on the current
stock of knowledge and capabilities (Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1996) because longterm strategies of building new capabilities can require a tradeoff between current
and future profitability. Such a choice is viable only when the firm’s survival is not at
stake and it has the necessary short-term cash flows to undertake learning initiatives
and bear the associated risks (Decarolis & Deeds, 1999; Kogut & Zander, 1992,
1996). Conversely, too much reliance on exploiting current profitability may deter
a firm from developing capabilities for the future (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Stiglitz,
1987). The decision of maintaining and developing some capabilities over others is
influenced by the current knowledge of the firm and expectations from economic
gain by exploring newer technologies and organizing principles into future market
developments (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Thus, the promise of economic rents is
usually sufficient to convince firms that developing new capabilities is a worthwhile
activity (Decarolis & Deeds, 1999; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1996). The most significant
determinant of ‘make’ or ‘buy’ and ‘within firm’ or ‘with suppliers’ has been found to
be the transaction costs associated with relying on outside suppliers (Kogut & Zander,
1992; Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Walker & Weber, 1984). It has been shown that
volume and technological uncertainties, and the production capability of the buyer,
reduce the advantage of buy over make, while supplier production cost advantage,
competitiveness of a supplier market, and the size of supplier market increases the
advantage of ‘buy’ over ‘make’ (Walker & Weber, 1984). While boundaries of firms are
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influenced by transaction costs (Williamson, 1981, 1991, 2000), performance relies
mostly on owned capabilities (Kogut & Zander, 1992).
An innovation can be contracted, licensed, or developed with alliances when the
firm does not have the necessary capabilities required to bring it to market, when there
are uncertain cash flows, and when imitators and competitors are better positioned
(Teece, 1986). Specifically, when an innovation has the potential to earn high returns,
but the firm does not have the capabilities to develop the assets necessary for bringing
the innovation to market, the available options are to develop the innovation with
partners or license it out (Friedman, 2006). It also means that when the firm has the
requisite capabilities to develop the assets that are critical for commercialization but the
innovation only has the potential for low returns, commercialization via partnership is
also preferable. Choosing between alliances for joint development or licensing depends
upon several factors beyond profit potential and capabilities. For example, the shortterm profitability needs of the firm and high investment costs (Kalaignanam, Shankar
& Varadarajan, 2007; Makadok & Walker, 2000; Zahra, 1996), along with the existence
of steep learning curves (Malerba, 1992), make a strong case for licensing. Additionally,
licensing an innovation is an option when the licensor has superior, tacit knowledge that
protects the ability to secure rents, when capabilities required for commercialization
are beyond those possessed by the firm, or there is pressure for immediate survival.
In the case of the lack of capabilities, if the innovating firm does not license its new
technology, competitors may quickly develop their own, possibly better, versions of
the technology. By licensing the technology, the innovating firm may ensure that its
version of the technology becomes the dominant design in an industry advantage (Hill,
1992; Schilling, 1998; Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Advantages of partnerships include
sharing costs and risks of development, combining complementary skills and resources
(Ahuja, 2000b; Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Brass, Galaskiewicz & Greve, 2004; Freeman,
1991; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007), enabling
transfer of knowledge between firms (Cowan & Jonard, 2004; Freeman, 1991; Gulati,
Nohria & Zaheer, 2000), and facilitation of creation of shared standards (Brass et al.,
2004; Gulati, 1995, 1998; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Powell et al., 1996; Provan et al.,
2007). A clear example of these advantages is in the commercialization of Microsoft’s
Windows software. Developing complementary assets needed for commercialization
of the software required sets of capabilities that were distant from what Microsoft
possessed, but the partnership with Intel resulted in the emergence of the industry
standard Wintel and a success for both firms.
Going back to the transaction-cost economics (Williamson, 1981, 1983, 1991,
1994, 1998), contracts with partners in developing an innovation may lead to a
reduction of uncertainty at the cost of opportunism. Such behavior occurs when
an innovation, albeit novel, has uncertain market potential, or requires capabilities
beyond those of the firm. A governance structure that leads to reduction of uncertainty
in this scenario is more important than a partner being opportunistic. Mutual gains
from contracts and alliances will be a less risky form of governance than in-house
development. Such was the case for Microsoft.
Lastly, when the potential to earn profits is low and the capabilities needed to
develop assets required to commercialize the innovation are not available internally or
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through partnerships, the most logical option is to sell the innovation to another firm.
Given this low-returns scenario, this would be the least risky option. That, of course,
assumes that the sale would not result in the buyer becoming a future competitor.
Thus,
Proposition 3a: An innovation with low profit potential, combined with the lack
of capabilities necessary for developing the assets required for commercialization,
will result in selling the innovation.
Proposition 3b: Firms will mitigate the risk of commercialization via alliances or
licensing when an innovation has low profit-potential even though the capabilities
for commercialization are present, or when the innovation has high profit-potential
but the capabilities are not present.
Proposition 3c: An innovation with high profit potential, combined
with the capabilities necessary for developing the assets required for
commercialization, will result in retained ownership of the innovation and inhouse commercialization.
The base line model along with the moderators was depicted in Figure 1.

Moderators
The effect of the moderators on Proposition 3 is depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
Figure 2: Model of Factors Affecting Governance of Innovation Commercialization
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Figure 3: Effect of moderators on Governance

Firm-level Moderators
Networks. Social, external, and internal networks are considered three different
network types that focus on different levels of analysis, use different theoretical
constructs, and explain different outcomes (Van Wijk, 2003). For the purpose of
discussion, networks external to the firm and those which extend its boundaries will
be the focus. External network research focuses on networks as a governance mode
intermediating markets and hierarchies—e.g., joint-ventures and strategic alliances. It
highlights the competitive dimension of networks and, therefore, focuses particularly on
performance issues (Dyer & Singh, 1998). The terms ‘external’ or ‘interorganizational’
network are used interchangeably with strategic alliances, coalitions, and cooperative
arrangements (Provan et al., 2007), and have been tied to resource dependence theory
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1991), and
interorganizational contracts (Ariño & Reuer, 2006). Despite these differences, all
definitions of external networks refer to common themes including social interaction,
relationships, connectedness, collaboration, collective action, trust, and cooperation
(Provan et al., 2007).
Organizations enter alliances with each other to access critical resources,
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knowledge, and capabilities, but they rely on information from the network of prior
alliances to determine with whom to cooperate (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). These new
alliances modify the existing network, prompting an endogenous dynamic between
organizational action and network structure that drives the emergence of external
networks. While networks are formed to access and share resources (Dyer & Singh,
1998; Gnyawali, He & Madhvan, 2006; Gulati, 1998; Gulati & Kletter, 2005; Gulati
et al., 2000; Klein, Rai & Straub, 2007b; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), they themselves
become valuable resources, enabling a firm to access and possibly increase its stock
of knowledge and capabilities beyond its boundaries (Barney, 1991; Mata, Fuerst &
Barney, 1995; Melville, Kraemer & Gurbaxani, 2004; Porter, 1980; Ray, Muhanna &
Barney, 2005). The characteristics of an organization’s network of external relations
are relevant to a firm’s ability to commercialize innovations (Nohria, 1992; Nohria
& Eccles, 1992). Networks can be defined as the collective of structures and
collaborations between organizations. From an external-network standpoint, this
includes social networks, business clusters, partnerships, business ecosystems, and
relationships with innovation engines. To better understand the impact of networks on
the commercialization process, the concepts of centrality and multiplexity in networks
need to be considered.
Centrality determines the relative importance of an entity or a node within a
network. While some organizations will struggle to reach the central position on any
network to maintain competitive advantage and control key resources and capabilities,
others may instead link themselves to the central node (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gnyawali
et al., 2006; Gulati, 1995, 1998; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Gulati & Kletter, 2005;
Gulati et al., 2000; Klein, Rai & Straub, 2007a). Being in a central position or having a
direct link to the central node within an external network, firms are better able to access
resources and capabilities, such as finance, manufacturing facilities, or distribution
channels that help in the commercialization of innovations (Gnyawali et al., 2006;
Klein et al., 2007a).
Multiplexity deals with the strength of the relationship an organization maintains
with network partners, based on the number of types of links (e.g., research ties,
joint programs, referrals, and shared personnel) connecting them (Provan et al.,
2007). Multiplexity is also referred to as a heterogeneity of networks (Newman,
2001). Multiplex ties are thought to be an indicator of the strength and durability of
an organization’s links because they enable the connection between an organization
and its linkage partner to be sustained even if one type of link dissolves (Provan
et al., 2007). Two entities that have collaborated in multiple arrangements such as
manufacturing and marketing or the exchange of unique information, are likely to
know each other better, on average, than those that have had fewer such collaborations.
These interactions add value to the network, enabling the exchange of knowledge and
capabilities required to succeed in the commercialization of innovations.
External networks can also include ties with universities, national research
laboratories, and other research institutes that conduct basic research and are
regarded as engines of innovation (Agarwal, 2006; Chataway & Wield, 2000; Colyvas
et al., 2002; Henderson & Cockburn, 1996; Henderson et al., 1998; Henderson &
Clark, 1990; Jaffe et al., 1993; Numprasertchai & Igel, 2005). It constitutes a type
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of multiplex tie that we mentioned earlier. Knowledge exchange between firms and
innovation engines occurs through formal and informal mechanisms such as scientific
meetings, licenses, joint ventures, research contracts, consulting, personal networks,
research grants, recruitment of students, email, shared databases, workshops, and
communities of practice (Cohen, Kamienski & Espino, 1998; Cohen et al., 1998;
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 2002; Hoegl & Schulze, 2005;
Oliver, 2004; Powell, 1998; Rothaermel & Thursby, 2005; Salman & Saives, 2005; Van
den Bosch, Volberda & Boer, 1999). Through contracted and funded research, both the
innovator and the commercializer benefit and the innovation/commercialization cycle
appears to crystallize faster and more effectively (Birkinshaw & Gibson, 2004). Such
relationships help shorten the innovation cycle and promote faster commercialization,
giving the innovator access to the firm’s capabilities and also leading to the firm gaining
knowledge about a new technology or innovation.
In our previous section on governance, it was already mentioned that advantages of
partnerships include sharing costs and risks of development, combining complementary
skills and resources, enabling transfer of knowledge between firms, and the creation
of shared standards. Further, choosing between alliances for joint development or
licensing depends upon several factors including profit potential and capabilities. The
decision to collaborate with networks to bring an innovation to market is therefore
multidimensional. The factors include: (a) whether the firm or the collaborator has the
required capabilities, (b) the degree to which collaborations would make proprietary
technologies vulnerable to expropriation by a potential competitor, (c) the importance
a firm plays in controlling the development process for its innovations, and (d) the
role of development projects in building the firm’s own capabilities or permitting it to
access another firm’s capabilities (Ahuja, 2000a; Hagedoorn, 1993; Powell et al., 1996).
Centrality and multiplexity in external networks moderate the relationship
between viability and governance by extending firm boundaries. Firstly, for innovations
with low profit potential, networks facilitate easier disposition of the technology to
potential buyers. Knowledge of network partners and their specific needs allows the
disposing firm to more quickly find a customer for the technology. Additionally, that
knowledge may lead to a better fit between the innovation and the customer’s needs,
which could, in turn, lead to increased funds from the sale. Networks thus have a
positive effect on disposition as a form of governance. Secondly, and as discussed,
networks aid in accessing capabilities that are essential for commercialization, such
as those in manufacturing, or marketing and distribution. That access can come either
in the form of licensing or alliances and as noted earlier, it depends upon the need
to lock out competitors or to establish a dominant design. An additional potential
benefit though is that by licensing or forming alliances to bring the innovation to
market, firms that may have been natural competitors can effectively be removed from
the equation.
When a firm has an innovation with high profit potential, plus the necessary
capabilities for commercialization of the product, the concern is with protecting
proprietary knowhow and controlling the development process to secure any available
rents. Those requirements and that outcome are best achieved by keeping all activities
in-house rather than working with partners. Networks, however, have a negative
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impact on the selection of that form of governance. Firms centrally located in the
networks will have access to resources from other firms and will therefore be more
likely to develop innovations with partners. Being central in a network will enable
the firm to have higher bargaining power which should not be compromised even
when a critical capability required for commercialization is developed outside the firm
boundary. Hence, centrality resists suppliers from becoming potential competitors so
that firms can enjoy sourcing capabilities from other firms. Firms that are not central
in the network will also tend to either license or codevelop innovations (with high
profit potential) with partners, because being in the network will enable them to access
critical resources, capabilities, and knowledge that would otherwise be expensive to
develop. Overall, easier access to complementary resources offsets the advantages of
in-house commercialization of innovations. Thus,
Proposition 4a: External network relationships have a positive moderating effect
on decisions to sell an innovation.
Proposition 4b: External network relationships have a positive moderating effect
on decisions to license or develop an innovation with partners.
Proposition 4c: External network relationships have a negative moderating effect
on decisions to use in-house commercialization.
Absorptive capacity. According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Jansen, Vanden
Bosch and Volberda (2005), absorptive capacity is the limit to the quantity and rate
at which a firm can absorb scientific or technological information. Conceptually,
absorptive capacity is similar to information-processing capacity but at the firm level
rather than at the individual level. Absorptive capacity enables firms to predict the
commercial potential of technological advances more accurately (Cohen & Levinthal,
1990). It is inherent within a firm’s knowledge capabilities by which it acquires,
assimilates, transforms, and exploits knowledge resources to produce capabilities such
as innovativeness (Zahra & George, 2002), and a firm’s investment in prior experience
can increase its rate of future learning by building its absorptive capacity (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002).
Zahra and George (2002) deconstructed absorptive capacity into potential and
realized absorptive capacities. Potential absorptive capacity, which includes knowledge
acquisition and assimilation, captures efforts expended in identifying and acquiring
new external knowledge and in assimilating knowledge obtained from external sources
(Zahra & George, 2002). Realized absorptive capacity, which includes knowledge
transformation and exploitation, encompasses deriving new insights and consequences
from the combination of existing and newly acquired knowledge, and incorporating
transformed knowledge into operations (Zahra & George, 2002). Realized absorptive
capacity converts knowledge into products, services, and technologies (Jansen et
al., 2005). Through the combination of potential and realized absorptive capacity,
firms increase the distinctiveness of their innovations (Yli-Renko, Autio & Sapienza,
2001) and are able to develop new innovations that differ substantially from existing
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products, services, and processes and, all else being equal, should have the potential for
generating higher income. In turn, that means that absorptive capacity should therefore
have a positive moderating effect on in-house commercialization and a negative effect
on the other forms of governance.
In addition to absorbing and capitalizing on external scientific and technological
information, absorptive capacity also means being able to identify and build on
internally generated information. In other words, learning from and capitalizing on
prior experience, which in turn, shapes the ability to recognize the value of new
information and use it effectively. A firm’s experimentation with innovations increases
its knowledge and experience with the technology, and also its understanding of
market potential, which leads to better gauging of the profit potential of innovations.
Additionally, it helps in developing new innovations, which can help firms stay ahead
of competitors. In resource-based theory terms, previous experience is a valuable and
difficult-to-imitate resource that provides firms with an advantage. Firms that don’t
build on such experience effectively are starting anew with the process of bringing
each new innovation to market and thus, they are at the bottom of the learning curve
and unable to capitalize on cost-reducing, experience-curve effects. Further, prior
experience will lead firms to identify complementary innovations that will add value
to the innovation to make it more attractive. Thus, absorptive capacity has a positive
moderating effect on the relationship between viability and governance leading to
ownership of innovations,
Proposition 5a: Absorptive capacity has a negative moderating effect on decisions
to sell an innovation.
Proposition 5b: Absorptive capacity has a negative moderating effect on decisions
to license or develop an innovation with partners.
Proposition 5c: Absorptive capacity has a positive moderating effect on decisions
to use in-house commercialization.
Micro- and Macro-level Factors
Thus far, our arguments have focused on the role of the firm and firm-level factors
in innovation commercialization. As such it is a meso-level model. There are, however,
factors at both the micro and macro levels that affect success in commercialization and
thus need addressing.
Micro level. At the micro level, the previous experience of managers in bringing
an innovation to market will affect their actions with subsequent commercializations.
Prospect theory, which explains decision making involving uncertainty in the context
of psychology and economics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), provides a useful means
of assessing the effect of this micro-level variable on the selection of form of governance
for commercialization. The theory offers insights into why managers make nonoptimizing decisions rather than strictly choosing those that are profit maximizing.
The most distinctive implication of the theory is the effect that previous performance
has on managerial attitudes towards risk. If previous firm performance is acceptable,

46

Journal of Business and Management – Vol. 18, No. 1, 2012

then managers will avoid risk-laden situations, even if the associated returns are high.
However, if previous firm performance is below target, they will be more likely to
accept more risk for higher returns. That relationship, however, is moderated by the
framing that previous experience provides. If managers have been successful with such
actions in the past, their assessment of the probability of failure will be artificially
low. If they have failed in the past, it will be artificially high. Holding previous firmperformance constant, successful previous experience with a hierarchy solution to
commercialization would again push them towards hierarchy. Similarly, if in the past a
firm did not have the necessary capabilities to commercialize a product, but managers
successfully developed them, they would be more likely to underestimate the risk of
doing so again. A poor experience would push them away from hierarchy. The same
logic applies to previous experiences with selling an innovation or partnering to bring
it to market.
Obviously, Prospect theory is temporal in nature, whether previous performance
has met target performance or not, and what managers do today is affected by what has
happened in the past. Thus,
Proposition 6a: If firm performance is below target, then the probability of selling
is reduced in favor of partnering or hierarchy, and the probability of partnering is
reduced in favor of hierarchy.
Proposition 6b: If firm performance is above target, then the probability of
hierarchy is reduced in favor of partnering (unless that form of governance has
been successful in the past), and the probability of partnering is reduced in favor of
selling (unless that form of governance has been successful in the past).
Macro level. For the macro-level, the established environmental constructs of
dynamism, munificence, and complexity is drawn on. Environmental dynamism
results in uncertainty and unpredictability in the external environment (Child, 1972;
Dess & Beard, 1984). Firms faced with more stable environments tend to emphasize
static efficiency at the expense of dynamic efficiency, and this process is reversed when
firms find themselves in unstable environments (Ghemawat & Costa, 1993). In other
words, a firm tends to be inward-looking during stable times and outward-looking
during disruptions. In highly dynamic environments, there is rapid and discontinuous
change in demand, competitors, technology, and regulations. As a result, information
is often inaccurate, unavailable, or obsolete (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Simsek,
2009). Therefore, dynamic environments require that the organization develops
adaptive responses quickly and expands the scope of information acquisition and
gathering (Sidhu, Volberda & Commandeur, 2004; Simsek, 2009). In doing so,
dynamism imposes a challenge to the organization by demanding flexibility and agile
actions ranging from information scanning, selection, and processing to interpretation
(Miller & Friesen, 1983; Simsek, 2009), and that strains an organization’s informationprocessing capability (Simsek, 2009). Such problems can cripple an organization’s
ability to correctly assess the profit potential of an innovation. Therefore, environmental
dynamism has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between viability and
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governance such that there is a reduced tendency to use an in-house approach to
commercialization. The corollary to that is that dynamism will positively affect the
relationship between viability and governance that leads to selling an innovation and
licensing or developing it with partnerships. Even if the firm currently posseses what
it considers to be the capabilities required for successful commercialization, a dynamic
environment may make them useless or irrelevant in the future. Thus, licensing or
development with partners remains the lower-risk option. All else being equal, such as
prospect theory considerations, then managers will likely choose to avoid, rather than
incur risk.
An environment is said to be munificent to the extent that it supports a firm’s
continued and sustained growth, and thus refers to the extent to which critical
resources exist in the environment (Dess & Beard, 1984). The degree of resource
abundance in the firm’s environment (i.e., munificence) has a significant impact on the
firm’s entrepreneurial orientation and subsequent growth (Castrogiovanni, 1991), as
well as its ability to overcome capability weaknesses (Sirmon et al., 2010). Thus, in a
munificent environment, a firm is more likely to take ownership of a venture (Tyebjee
& Bruno, 1984). When the environment is munificent, that is, there are resources
for growth, demand is present and the profit potential is high, not being able to own
the technology and develop it in-house sacrifices income. When the environment
offers opportunities and resources for growth, developing capabilities that may be
distant from its current ones, but which are required for commercialization, becomes
a more attractive option than in an environment that does not offer the same income
opportunities. Thus, munificence has a positive moderating effect on the relationship
between viability and governance leading to ownership, whereas the relationship
leading to licensing or development with partnership or selling the innovation is
affected negatively.
Environmental complexity is defined as the heterogeneity and concentration of
environmental elements (Dess & Beard, 1984). A highly-complex environment is
characterized by the level of heterogeneity of firms within the industry, a diverse range
and high number of suppliers and customers, and a wide range of products being
offered (Dess & Beard, 1984). A complex environment will be perceived as requiring
more information processing than a simple environment and thus be less predictable
(Dess & Beard, 1984; Simsek, 2009). Complex environments do not diminish an
organization’s ability to act, but make it difficult to identify what is most appropriate
(Boisot & Child, 1999). Under this scenario, reduction of uncertainty becomes an
important criterion, and that can be achieved either by licensing the innovation or
developing it with partners. Similarly, the uncertainty created by complexity also will
likely result in more selling of innovations. Thus, complexity has a positive moderating
effect on the relationships between viability and governance leading to selling the
innovation, licensing the innovation or developing with partners, and a negative
moderating effect on in-house commercialization. Therefore,
Proposition 7a. Environmental dynamism has a negative moderating effect on the
relationship between viability and governance leading to hierarchy, but a positive
effect on partnering or selling the innovation.
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Proposition 7b. Environmental munificence has a positive moderating effect on the
relationship between viability and governance leading to hierarchy, but a negative
effect on partnering or selling the innovation.
Proposition 7c. Environmental complexity has a negative moderating effect on the
relationship between viability and governance leading to hierarchy, but a positive
effect on partnering or selling the innovation.

Discussion
Commercialization of innovation is a critical entrepreneurial activity that leads to
economic growth, but is not yet fully understood. A model has been constructed that
explains how firms go from idea generation to innovation commercialization. When
an idea emerges, then its viability has to be assessed before the process moves on to
commercialization. This baseline framework constitutes a mid-level process model.
Underpinning the core of the model is the argument that success in commercialization
is derived from selecting the governance form that allows the firm to secure returns
from an innovation while mitigating unnecessary risk. That is achieved by retaining
ownership of the technology, licensing it to or developing it with partners, or selling it.
Which of the three forms of governance should be selected is determined by the profit
potential of the innovation and the current capabilities of the firm. Profit potential is
part of the determination of the viability of an innovation and rests on the assumption
that the technological and legal mechanisms that govern innovators’ ability to
earn rents from innovation are in place (Teece, 1986). An innovation is sold before
developing it into a finished good when the profit potential from the innovation is low
and ownership of or access to capabilities that are required for commercialization are
distant. If one of the two main conditions of profit potential or capabilities is in place,
the innovation is either licensed or developed with partners. If, however, the profit
potential is high and the firm has the capabilities required to develop the innovation
and take it to market, the firm will retain ownership of the innovation and governance
will be hierarchical.
Four moderators were identified that affect the strength of the relationship between
viability and governance. First of those moderators was external networks, which had
a negative effect on the likelihood of a firm commercializing the innovation in-house,
and a positive effect on selling the innovation or licensing or developing with partners.
Absorptive capacity, our second moderator, had a positive effect on the relationship
between viability and governance leading to in-house commercialization, and a negative
effect on selling the innovation or licensing or developing with partners. At this point,
the meso-level analysis was deviated from and included both micro and macro factors.
The previous experience of managers in bringing innovations to market was our third
moderator—a micro factor. Prospect theory was used to argue that if firm performance
is above target, the probability of hierarchy is reduced in favor of partnering or selling,
particularly if those forms of governance have been used successfully in the past. If
firm performance is below target, then the probability of selling was reduced in favor
of partnering or hierarchy, and the probability of partnering was reduced in favor of
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hierarchy. The final moderators were at the macro level: environmental dynamism,
munificence, and complexity. They have mixed effects on the relationship between
viability and governance. Dynamism and complexity had a negative effect on the
relationship between viability and governance leading to hierarchy and a positive effect
on the on selling the innovation or licensing or developing with partners. Munificence,
however, had a positive effect on the likelihood of a firm using hierarchy, and a negative
effect on the use of licensing or developing with partners.
This work has made contributions to both theory and practice. For research, the
framework recognized that successful commercialization is a process that has distinct
stages and is as dependent on moderators to the process as it is on the direct effects. The
paper offered insights into idea generation—interactions between source and type—
that need exploring in more detail to determine under what conditions the output from
those interactions is maximized, both in terms of quantity and quality. It also introduced
the concept of viability assessment into the process of commercialization—something
that is most notable by its absence from the theoretical literature on innovation
management. A direct link between governance and success was also made, recognizing
that not all innovations have to be developed in-house or with partners—they also can
be sold, an outcome that is still commercialization. Addressing these questions should
further our understanding in terms of what forms of governance should maximize
returns from innovation. This work recognized that successful commercialization is
a complex, multi-level process that requires input from extant theories as diverse as
those explaining governance, networks, absorptive capacity, managerial behavior, and
environmental factors. It opens up the potential for extending empirical research on
commercialization. Additionally, the assumptions on which the model is based need
to be empirically tested for validity. Before these or any other lessons can be acted
upon with confidence, much research remains to be done. Surveys or secondary data
sets can be used to conduct positivist research in order to test the propositions, while
detailed case studies of firms in specific industries under given circumstances may aid
in attaining an interpretivist understanding of commercialization of innovation that is
deeper, richer, and more detailed.
In terms of practice, the baseline model revealed an interaction between internal
and external sources of ideas for innovation, and whether or not they were deliberate
or emergent. To be effective, those interactions need managing. Second, a careful
assessment of the profit potential, vis-à-vis the firm’s capabilities, helped force a
separation between commitment to the newly developed technology and the ability
to make money from it. Third, the model highlights the need for a firm to consider
its network of partners and their capabilities before plunging into a decision. This
permits risk reduction, it prevents a firm from disposing of a technology that could
be developed with partners, it allows the firm to find better capabilities than those
it possesses, and it allows the firm to hand-off development and commercialization,
which then frees up time and resources for bringing other innovations to market.
Fourth, it showed that firms need to question the effects of previous experiences on
commercialization of innovations. For instance, if managers have been successful with
such actions in the past, their assessment of the probability of failure will be artificially
low. Lastly, an understanding of the macro-level environmental factors of dynamism,
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munificence, and complexity is crucial in determining whether an innovation is best
kept in-house, developed with partners, or simply disposed of.
All projects have certain inherent limitations. In this work, it was implicitly held
constant the impact of networks within the firm as a potential moderator between
viability and governance. Further, the paper did not discuss how the variables in the
baseline model and the four moderators interact with each other. In determining the
effects of each moderator, we implicitly held the other constructs constant. Future
research extensions could be made on understanding the impact of these moderators,
and internal networks, as a gestalt. Within that gestalt there also will be a feedback
loop from commercialization to idea generation within innovation sourcing, an issue
that was intentionally left beyond the scope of our discussions.
Some firms are good at innovation, but the fact remains that firms live and die
by their ability to successfully bring innovations to market. This work has provided a
theoretical model to address the question of what drives success in that process. While
the thinking in this work is of relevance to practice, we have generated a model that
should act as a catalyst for scholars to extend existing research on the commercialization
process, and thus create an even deeper understanding of this crucial business activity.
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